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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Tying Arrangement With Trademark as the Tying 
Item Is Not a Per Se Violation of the 
Antitrust Laws-Susser v. Carvel Corp. 
Several independent franchised soft ice-cream outlets brought 
suit for treble damages against Carvel Corporation, the franchising 
company, alleging that the contract between them constituted an 
illegal tying arrangement1 in violation of section 3 of the Clayton 
Act2 and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.3 The contract bound 
the dealers to purchase from Carvel-appointed suppliers all com-
modities sold as part of the retail dairy composite. Plaintiffs stipu-
lated that they would rely on per se violations at trial. The district 
court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show the alleged viola-
tions and, in any case, the defendant had proved its defense that 
the arrangements were necessary to protect the integrity of the 
product.4 On appeal, held, affirmed. A trademark tie-in, to be 
per se illegal, must meet the same tests applied in a patent tie-in situ-
ation: there must be both market dominance and the affecting of a 
substantial amount of commerce; here, the plaintiffs had failed to 
establish either element. One judge dissented in part on the ground 
that patents and trademarks are sufficiently similar to justify the 
same presumption of existence of sufficient economic power in the 
trademark situation as is permitted in the patent setting, leaving 
only the requirement of affecting a substantial amount of com-
merce, which he felt was met here. The dissent also disagreed with 
the district court's finding that the defendant had adequately proved 
1. Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant-supplier contracts were invalid, that the 
defendant engaged in a price-fixing scheme, and that the contract constituted an illegal 
exclusive dealing franchise. The first two charges were summarily rejected by the 
court. The exclusive dealing arrangement was found to be justified by the necessity 
of protecting the good will of the trademark. 
The possibility of construing the patents and patented articles as part of the tying 
item in the principal case will not be considered in this note. 
2. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). 
3. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1958). Both the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts have been interpreted as prohibiting tying arrangements, with certain 
qualifications. The Sherman Act is applicable in all tying-arrangement cases, while the 
Clayton Act is restricted to tie-ins relating to "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, 
supplies or other commodities •••• " 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). Whether 
the court in the principal case included trademarks within the purview of the latter 
statute was not stated, but the dissent seemed to assume that the Clayton Act provided 
the basis for suit. Principal case at 513. Under the holding in Northern Pac. Ry. v. 
United States, 356 U.S. I (1958), the legal difference in statutory categories would 
appear to be immaterial, as emphasized by Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent therein. Id. 
at 13-16 (dissenting opinion). 
4. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The district court also 
found that a previous contract between the parties was invalid, but this ruling was 
not appealed. 
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that its arrangement was justified to protect the good will of the 
product. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. 
granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3151 (U.S. Oct. 27, 1964) (No. 355). 
A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one 
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a 
different ( or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not pur-
chase that product from any other supplier."5 These agreements 
almost invariably result in a restraint of trade as the buyer is fore-
closed from dealing with other potential suppliers of the tied prod-
uct and those suppliers are denied access to the market.6 However, 
a tying arrangement in itself is not illegal; it becomes a per se viola-
tion only when it is demonstrated that the defendant has sufficient 
economic power with respect to the tying product to force the sale 
of the tied product on the buyer7 and that a not insubstantial 
amount of commerce is affected.8 The courts have always evinced 
5. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). The tied item must 
be separate and distinct from the tying item. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 
653, 655 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961). 
6. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962): "['I']hey [tying arrangements] 
may force buyers into giving up the purchase of substitutes for the tied product, • • • 
and they may destroy the free access of competing suppliers of the tied product to the 
consuming market •••• " Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949): 
Tie-ins "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." See also 
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 237 F.2d 459, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1964); Bowman, Tying 
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Lockhart & Sacks, 
The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements 
Violate Section J of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 913, 944 (1952); Turner, The 
Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50 (1958). 
7. This requirement is also denominated "market dominance." The burden imposed 
on the plaintiff to show this element may be lessened by judicial inference of "suffi-
cient economic power" from other facts such as product uniqueness or consumer appeal. 
United States v. Loew's Inc., supra note 6. The majority in Susser utilized the "market 
dominance" and "market control" terminology but did not appear to consider the 
alternative of inferring economic power from the existence of the trademark. The 
court's reliance on Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), to validate 
these contracts would appear to be misplaced. In Northern Pacific, the Court held 
that from the nature of the commodity involved (land), the requisite economic power 
could be presumed under the Sherman Act, previously interpreted to require a more 
stringent standard of proof than a proceeding under § 3 of the Clayton Act. It has 
been implied that the fact of the tying arrangement by itself is enough to show the 
sufficient economic power over the tying item. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra 
note 6, at 470; Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 945; Turner, supra note 6, at 64. 
There are many illustrations of the lack of clarity as t? what is meant b}'. the _term 
"market dominance." Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. Umted States, supra, w,_th Tnnes-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). Compare Umted States 
v. Loew's Inc., supra note 6, with White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
8. This criterion would seem to be easily satisfied under the dicta in Brown Shoe 
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329-30 (1962), concerning the amount of commerce 
that must be shown to be affected in tying arrangements: "Thus, for example, if a 
particular vertical arrangement, considered under § 3 [of the Clayton Act], appears 
to be a limited term exclusive-dealing contract, the market foreclosure must generally 
be significantly greater than if the arrangement is a tying contract •••• :13ecause such 
an arrangement [tying] is inherently anticompetitive, we have held that its use by an 
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a marked hostility toward tying arrangements,9 but recent decisions 
have cast doubts on the applicability of the per se rule.10 The most 
recent Suprem~ Court dictum on the subject, that tie-ins "may fall 
in that category [of per se illegality], though not necessarily so,''11 
sheds little light on the question, and the overall area of the per se 
illegality of tying clauses is not well defined.12 
It is clear that a tying arrangement wherein the tying item is 
patented will be held to be a per se violation of the patent laws 
under the doctrine of patent misuse.13 The antitrust laws have 
supplemented the patent misuse doctrine in preventing the patentee 
from extending his patent monopoly.14 The rationale for the strict 
application of the antitrust laws in this context is that the crucial 
economic power can be presumed when the tying item is patented, 
so that only the amount of commerce affected need be demon-
strated.15 The Attorney General's Report16 distinguished between 
patents involving broad and basic grants to the patentee and those 
of a more limited character, recommending that only tie-ins with 
established company is likely 'substantially to lessen competition' although only a 
relatively small amount of commerce is affected." However, the question of whether 
this test was met also caused disagreement in Susser. Principal case at 519 and 514 
(dissenting opinion). It is possible that the fulfillment of either of the two require-
ments will suffice to show illegality. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra note 6, at 469. 
Both tests are intended to be methods of determining whether the seller has the 
power to force the buyer to take the tied product along with the tying product. The 
per se rule has evolved in the belief that when a substantial amount of commerce is 
involved in the tied product, this power of coercion can be inferred, thereby saving 
the litigants and the court the trouble of much unnecessary proof. United States v. 
Loew's Inc., supra note 6, at 45 n.4; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 7, 
at 5. For an analysis of the function of the per se rule in eliminating superfluous proof, 
see Stedman, Tying Arrangements, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 64 (1964). 
9. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); International 
Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); cases and authorities cited 
notes 6-8 supra. 
10. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The emerging 
business justification defense has further confused the issue. See cases cited in note! 
19-25 infra and accompanying text. The courts, when enunciating the per se rule, 
almost invariably use some degree of qualifying language. The White Motor decision, 
while containing only dicta concerning tie-ins, can be interpreted to be a somewhat 
hesitant and unsure return to the "rule of reason." For comparisons of the rule of 
reason and per se approaches, see generally Lockhart &: Sacks, supra note 6; Loevinger, 
The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23 (1964); Paley, Antitrust 
Pitfalls in Exclusive Dealing-Recent Developments Under the Sherman, Clayton and 
FTC Acts, 37 NoTRE DAME LAW. 499 (1962); Turner, supra note 6; Note, 75 HAR.v. 
L. REv. 795 (1962); 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1038 (1963). 
11. White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 10, at 262. 
12. The semantic and procedural uncertainty surrounding the term "per se viola-
tion" is too protracted to be fully treated here. For a partial discussion, see text 
accompanying notes 45-48 infra. 
13. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Morton Salt Co. v. 
Suppiger Co., supra note 13. 
15. See United States v. Loew's Inc., supra note 14, at 45. 
16. An'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. (1955). 
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the former as the tying article be per se illegal and that a broader 
economic inquiry be instituted to determine the actual power pos-
sessed by the patentee.17 The courts have occasionally mentioned 
this distinction18 but have not affirmatively accepted it. Currently, 
it appears reasonable to conclude that any patent owner is running 
a serious risk of antitrust illegality in addition to patent misuse if he 
imposes a tying clause on a licensee, especially if the patent is 
an invention for which there is no reasonably interchangeable 
alternative. 
When the elements of the per se violation of the antitrust laws 
have been established, the common trend of judicial antitrust 
theory admits no possibility of any defense to the proved per se 
offense in either a patent or non-patent tie-in. But lower courts 
have taken cognizance of certain situations when the deleterious 
effects usually assumed to be inherent in tie-ins are outweighed 
by the desirable aspects of that particular tying arrangement.19 This 
still limited area of the "business justification" defense consists of 
proof that the defendant had an eminently justifiable and com-
pelling reason for imposing the arrangement, namely, protecting 
the good will or "integrity" of the product.20 The defense has been 
upheld in instances when an infant company was attempting to 
enter the market,21 when the tying product would function correctly 
only if used with the tied product,22 and when specifications for the 
17. Id. at 238: "[T]he patentee should be permitted to show that in the entire 
factual setting • • • the patent does not create the market power requisite to ille-
gality of the tying clause." Professor Handler took cognizance of the congressional 
criticism of the patents chapter and defended the tying arrangement procedure. 
Handler, An Examination of the Chapter on Patent Antitrust Problems in Attorney 
General's Committee Report, I ANTITRUST BuLL. 157, 159-60 (1955). Cf. Wood, Premises 
and Scope of the Patent Chapter, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 243 (1955); 24 GEO, WASH, L. 
REv. 122, 132 (1955). 
18. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 10 n.8 (1958). 
19. See, e.g., Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962); Dehydrating Proc• 
ess Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); 
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per 
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). 
20. For an extensive treatment of the defense, see Comment, Tying Arrangements 
Under the Antitrust Laws: The "Integrity of the Product" Defense, 62 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
1413 (1964). See generally Note, 3 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL&: COMMERCIAL L. REv. 317 
(1962); Note, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 746 (1961); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 804 (1961); Note, 72 YALE 
L.J. 1171 (1963). There seems to be some uncertainty as to whether the proved defense 
justifies the otherwise illegal tie-in or whether it renders the tie-in not a violation at all. 
Compare Baker v. Simmons Co., supra note 19 and Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 
(7th Cir. 1961), with United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra note 19 and Dehy-
drating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., supra note 19. As there would be no need 
for an affirmative defense unless a violation has occurred, the former would appear to 
be the better view. 
21. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra note 19. (But it is not sanctioned 
after the company is established in the market.) 
22. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961). 
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tied product would be so detailed as to be impracticable or im-
possible to satisfy by a competitor.23 The Supreme Court, while 
never fully defining the circumstances in which this defense is 
allowable, has frequently used language permitting the inference 
that some tie-ins are excusable,24 but it has also stated that tying ar-
rangements, if in a context of sufficient economic power, are illegal 
"'without elaborate inquiry as to ... the business excuse for their 
use.' "25 This latter dictum notwithstanding, it would appear that 
recognition of the business justification defense would tend to elimin-
ate much of the hardship that a harsh application of the per se rule 
could conceivably engender in the area of tying agreements. 
In Susser, the basic issue was whether the per se rule should be 
applied to a tie-in utilizing a trademark, rather than a patent, as the 
tying item. The emergence of the business justification defense in 
patent and other tie-ins might evidence a trend away from the per 
se rule and argue against any extension of it into the area of trade-
mark tie-ins. Often when expounding the rule of tie-in per se ille-
gality, the Supreme Court has included patent and copyright ex-
amples and, whether intentionally or otherwise, has failed to men-
tion trademark examples.26 The Court has also indicated, in a differ-
ent antitrust context, that significant differences exist between 
patents and trademarks.27 On the other hand, Mr. Justice Goldberg 
broadly stated in United States v. Loew's Inc.,28 that, "Even absent 
a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power may be 
inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from 
uniqueness in its attributes.''29 Such language would seem to support 
an argument that, since some trademarks are unique or highly dis-
tinctive in their attributes because they are prominent criteria by 
which the consumer measures the desirability of the product, suffi-
cient economic power is inherent in the trademark and the tie-ins 
23. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). In Susser, the 
majority accepted the findings of the district court that specifications would be im-
practicable to satisfy by a competitor. But cf. Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 
F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962). The dissent found the evidence on this point to be 
unsatisfactory and inconclusive. Principal case at 515 (dissenting opinion). 
24. See authorities cited note 20 supra. 
25. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51 (1962). 
26. E.g., id. at 45. 
27. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956). 
But cf. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 62 (7th ed. 1956). 
Some writers believe that antitrust implications are rampant in the trademark context, 
as a result of judicial protection. Borchardt, Are Trademarks an Antitrust Problem1, 
31 GEo. L.J. 245 (1943); Diggins, Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade, 32 GEO. L.J. 
113 (1944); Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14 
LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 323 (1949). Others stress the competitive element and conclude 
that trademark protection does not create monopoly problems. Oppenheim, The 
Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property, 40 TRADE• 
MARK REP. 613 (1950); Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 371, 379 (1962). 
28. 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
29. Id. at 45. (Emphasis added.) 
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should be considered per se illegal whenever a substantial amount 
of commerce is affected. But generally overlooked in the sparse 
literature30 dealing with the problem of the per se rule as applied 
to trademark tie-ins is the significance of this aspect of "uniqueness." 
A patent is unique or at least novel, by definition, but any quality 
of uniqueness or distinctiveness inherent in a trademark is pre-
ponderantly derived from its psychic impact on the consumer's 
mind.31 Depending on the renown of the mark, this impact could 
vary to a great degree, although the generalized argument that the 
owner automatically possesses real market power would seem 
realistically to have less force than when a patent is the tying item.32 
Furthermore, the trademark tying arrangement problem is com-
plicated by the Lanham Act, 33 the federal law governing registration 
of trademarks. Under this act, the trademark owner is under a 
duty to ensure that the licensee of the mark maintains the quality 
standards previously characterizing the product.34 The contention 
is thereby raised, as it was in Susser, that because of this duty to 
maintain quality standards by controlling the licensee's performance, 
the licensor should not be subject to the antitrust laws when they 
obstruct compliance with this provision of the Lanham Act. Al-
though the Lanham Act does not purport to deal directly with anti-
competitive· effects, it would appear that the argument for an im-
plied partial antitrust exemption neglects to take into account the 
purposes and prohibitions of the act. Section 33 (b) (7) 35 specifi-
cally allows, as a defense in an infringement action, the fact 
that plaintiff violated the antitrust laws. While this section has been 
severely criticized as having no bearing on infringement litigation,36 
30. For a discussion of trademarks in an antitrust context generally, see Schnider-
man, Trade-Mark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy and Fact, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
248, 259-68 (1949); Timberg, supra note 27; Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 371 (1962); 
Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1963). 
31. In the principal case, the defendant's testimony tended to establish the sub-
stantial monetary value inherent in the Carvel name. For the value of trademarks in 
soft ice-cream franchises generally, see Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714 
(D. Kan. 1962); Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. McCullough, 133 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Ill. 1955); 
Medd v. Boyd Wagner, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1955). The "source" and 
the "guaranty" theories are the two major conflicting rationales of the nature and 
function of trademarks. For an exposition and analysis of the comparative effects of 
the application of the two theories, see 3 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-
MARKS 976-81 (2d ed. 1950); Timberg, supra note 27. 
32. See Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 949 n.106. 
33. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as am.ended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1958), as am.ended, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (Supp. V, 1964). 
34. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 167 F.2d 
484 (C.C.P .A. 1948); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678 (D. Mass. 1953); 
Morse-Starrett Prod. Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Schniderman, 
iupra note 30, at 264-67. 
35. Section 33(b)(7), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U .S.C. § lll5(b)(7) (1958). 
36. See ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE·MARK MANUAL 294-97 (1947); Rogers, The 
Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trademarks, 14 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 173 
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the intent of the legislators to ensure that the trademark licensing 
provisions would not supersede antitrust proscriptions seems to be 
clear.87 Many cases contain generalizations to the effect that the 
Lanham Act provisions do not condone antitrust violations.88 Never-
theless, several courts have recently leaned toward the position that 
the protection of the owner's good will and the duty of quality con-
trol take precedence over violations of the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts:89 the role of the Lanham Act in requiring quality control is, 
at least, a relevant consideration in deciding whether per se illegality 
is appropriate in this area. 
Decisions involving situations somewhat analogous to that in 
Susser have reached different results, seemingly because of two 
conflicting considerations: the need to alleviate the anticompetitive 
effects inherent in tying arrangements on the one hand and sym-
pathy for the trademark licensor's attempt to preserve the good 
name of his product and, not incidentally, his financial interest 
therein on the other hand. In Baker v. Simmons Co.,40 the court 
stated that tying the use by motels and hotels of its sign carrying 
both the name of the motel or hotel and the trademark name of 
the mattress which it manufactured to the purchase of its mattresses 
by the motel or hotel was not an antitrust violation because it was 
justified by business reasons. The court in Anchor Serum Co. v. 
FTC,41 a case that involved a franchise arrangement resembling that 
(1949); but cf. Ooms & Frost, Incontestability, 14 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 220, 227 (1949). 
The ATI'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANrrrRusr REP. 260 (1955) recommended the repeal of 
§ 33(b)(7) and the enactment of the following amendment to § 46(a): "The benefit of 
incontestability under Section 15 of this Act shall not be deemed to affect the jurisdic-
tion of any Government agency to institute proceedings under the antitrust laws of the 
United States against the owner of such registered mark in any case in which the mark 
is alleged to have been used or is being used as an instrumentality of violation of the 
antitrust laws." 
37. See 92 CONG. REc. 7636, 7872-74 (1946) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney). "But 
it is of such great importance to the public of the United States that restraints of 
trade shall not be permitted, that the Senate insered [sic] this amendment . • • ." 
Id. at 7873. See also H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945); S. REP. No. 
1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946); Timberg, supra note 27, at 358-60. For the view of 
the Department of Justice, see Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-71 (1944). 
38. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); 
Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39, 46 (7th Cir. 1961). 
39. Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962); Baker 
v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962). These holdings, however, do not seem 
to be within the permissible area contemplated by the Court in Standard Oil Co. 
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), where it was stipulated that "the only situation, 
indeed, in which the protection of good will may necessitate the use of tying clauses 
is where specifications for a substitute [for the tied product] would be so detailed that 
they could not practicably be supplied." Id. at 306. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1173 
(1963). See generally Schniderman, supra note 30; Comment, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 371 
(1962). 
40. Supra note 39. 
41. 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954). 
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in Susser, found an illegal requirements contract42 instead of a tying 
arrangement and was vehement in its denunciation of the defend-
ant's coercive use of the "Anchor" tradename. In Denison Mattress 
Factory v. Spring-Air Co.,43 the court also found a requirements con-
tract but held that it was justified to protect the mark and indicated 
that a tie-in could be used for the same purpose. Switzer Bros. v. 
Locklin44 involved materials tied to both trademark and patent 
licenses, and the court found this to be a per se violation, citing the 
Lanham Act proscriptions. 
An analysis of these cases indicates that the conflict between 
opposing policy goals has engendered a certain degree of confusion 
regarding the term "per se violation" as used in the trademark 
tie-in context. In antitrust litigation the term has come to mean 
the demonstration by plaintiff of the requisite elements of an 
offense that usually involves a particularly pernicious effect on com-
petition.45 The difficulty has arisen when a real and justifiable need 
to employ the tie-in is alleged.46 The courts, when confronted witli 
the elements they deem sufficient to establish a per se violation but 
having a stronger desire to exonerate the owner who is trying to 
protect his interest, indiscriminately consider both evidence proving 
the violation and evidence tending to show that the tie-in is justifi-
able; and, while tacitly admitting that they are allowing a defense 
to a "per se" violation, they hold instead that no violation has oc-
curred.47 While this method frequently allows the court to reach a 
desirable result in the case before it, the overall consequence has 
been to confuse the determination of which issue is being proved 
and to mire the proceedings in a welter of statistics, whose evidential 
relevance is questionable. An important function of the so-called per 
se rule is to exclude the voluminous and often inconclusive proof of 
sufficient economic power (market dominance);48 however, the addi-
tional precept that no defense will be heard after the elements of 
the violation have been shown does not appear necessarily to follow. 
If courts are unwilling to accept the view that trademarks themselves 
42. It is frequently difficult to distinguish between tying arrangements, exclusive 
dealing arrangements, and requirements contracts. Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 
915, 920 n.23. The determination is essential since the last two categories demand a more 
stringent standard of proof to establish a violation. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), with Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 
U.S. 320 (1961). Full-line forcing, a type of tie-in, requires the purchaser to handle 
the seller's complete line of products. See generally Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line 
Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960). 
43. 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962). 
44. 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961). 
45. See, e.g., authorities cited note 6 supra. 
46. For illustrations of the assertion of this defense in its various forms, see the 
cases cited notes 40, 41, 43, and 44 supra. 
47. See, e.g., cases cited note 19 supra. 
48. See cases and authorities cited notes 7-8 supra. 
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do not necessarily indicate sufficient economic power, the situation 
would at least be improved if an approach were used that employed 
the per se rule only to the extent of facilitating prima facie proof of 
plaintiff's case. The burden would then fall on the defendant to 
show that circumstances justify the use of the particular arrange-
ment. In other words, it should be clear to the courts that the ap-
proach is one of "prima fade" illegality rather than "per se" ille-
gality as the latter term is traditionally used in antitrust context. 
Susser presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to 
elucidate several indistinct areas of antitrust law: namely, the appli-
cability and scope of the per se rule in tying arrangements, the 
nature of trademarks in antitrust contexts (including the effect of 
the Lanham Act in antitrust litigation), and the extent to which the 
good will or integrity of the product defense is allowable in a tie-in 
situation. If business justification achieves status as a valid de-
fense in an antitrust action, the unique attributes of many trade-
marks, the proscriptions of the Lanham Act against antitrust ille-
gality, and the general legislative and judicial antipathy toward tie-
ins would seem to dictate the extension of the prima facie illegality 
rule to cover tying clauses involving unique trademarks when a 
substantial amount of commerce is affected. On the other hand, if 
the presumption of illegality is treated as tantamount to a per se 
violation as it has been in the patent cases and no business justifica-
tion defense is permitted, the important element of quality control, 
so necessary to a franchise system such as Carvel, will be nearly im-
possible to maintain. 
